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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the future course that 
Japan should take regarding regional cooperation in light of the 
changes to the schemes addressed so far. Firstly, I examine the 
motives of the U.S. in favoring schemes such as the TPP and 
FTAAP in relation to how it intends to correct global imbalances 
that currently affect it (large deficits in its balance of payments). 
This naturally necessitates a discussion of efforts by China to 
address global imbalances affecting it (large surpluses in its 
balance of payments), as in this respect it is mirror image of the 
U.S. Secondly, I present an analysis of Japan’s economy in the 
wake of the global financial crisis, noting that the conventional 
model of East Asian economic development (often called 
“triangular trade”) has reached its limits as regards to corrections 
to the trade imbalance between the U.S. and China. As such, 
initiatives to exploit demand within Asia and to develop the 
Mekong region have grown in importance. Thirdly, I note that the 
TPP debate is arguably more of a political, diplomatic, and 
security issue than an economic one. I conclude by addressing how 
the TPP relates to the new National Defense Program Guidelines 
and by discussing the path that Japan should take.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2010, a series of three important and now generally annu-
al meetings on regional cooperation in East Asia were held in Hanoi, Viet-
nam; the 17th ASEAN Summit (October 28), the 13th ASEAN Plus Three 
Summit (October 29), and the 5th East Asia Summit (October 30).
As the title of the Chairman’s Statement “Towards the ASEAN Com-
munity: From Vision to Action” suggests, the main agenda of the 17th ASE-
AN Summit (the 10 ASEAN member states) was the creation of the ASE-
AN Community by 2015. To achieve this goal, ASEAN leaders adopted the 
“Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity”. This plan was drafted by the ASE-
AN Secretariat with the cooperation of the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), 
the Economic and Social Commission for Asia-Pacific (ESCAP), the World 
Bank, and others. The plan aims to promote: 1) improved linkages within 
ASEAN, 2) the planning of infrastructures within the community (worth a 
total of USD 380 billion), and 3) the regional prioritization of the Mekong 
region, thereby 4) facilitating the economic growth of ASEAN, helping to 
alleviate inter-ASEAN economic disparities, further integrating ASEAN, 
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and creating an ASEAN Community. 
The 13th ASEAN Plus Three Summit (13 countries: the 10 ASEAN 
member states plus Japan, China, and Korea) sought to reaffirm that the 
ASEAN Plus Three Summit itself is an important vehicle for the estab-
lishment of the East Asian Community and that in its creation ASEAN 
will play a central role. At the same time, it was acknowledged that the 
East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) could facilitate 
and play a complementary role in the creation of the East Asian Commu-
nity.
Lastly, at the 5th East Asia Summit (16 countries: the 10 ASEAN 
member states, Japan, China, Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand; 
also referred to as “ASEAN Plus Six”): 1) U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov were invited as spe-
cial guests and it was decided that the two countries could become official 
members of the East Asia Summit; 2) a report was presented on the com-
pletion of the Comprehensive Asia Development Plan (CADP) by ERIA; 
and 3) it was decided that both the East Asia Free Trade Area (EFTA) and 
the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) schemes 
supported respectively by China and Japan would be welcomed. 
The outcomes of these three meetings demonstrated that there had 
been no major changes to the framework underlying regional cooperation 
in East Asia since its substantial emergence after the Asian Financial Cri-
sis, especially with regard to the creation of the East Asian Community. It 
was reaffirmed that the ASEAN Plus Three, supported by China, was a 
key instrument for creating the East Asian Community, and at the same 
time it was recognized that the East Asia Summit supported by Japan 
could play an auxiliary role in the community’s formation. Nevertheless, 
there was an intense power struggle between Japan and China over who 
would lead regional cooperation initiatives in East Asia, and as a result, 
although statements issued clearly indicated that ASEAN would play the 
central role, there was little choice at the summit but to espouse both the 
EAFTA and CEPEA schemes as foundations for the creation of the East 
Asian Community. One thing different about this East Asia Summit from 
previous years was that the United States and Russia participated as offi-
cial members.
This basic framework, however, was to see an abrupt and dramatic 
change. This change was brought about by Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s 
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sudden announcement during his Policy Speech (October 1, 2010, during 
an extraordinary Diet session) that the government would be considering 
participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP; also known as the 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement), followed by the 
“The Yokohama Vision－Bogor and Beyond” declaration at the 18th APEC 
Summit (November 13 & 14, 2010), which in called for the creation of an 
“APEC community” in connection with the TPP.
Prime Minister Kan’s Policy Speech comprised eight parts, the sixth of 
which was titled “Implementing Active Diplomacy to Open Up the Country 
and Build the Future”. In it, Kan mentions of the TPP for the first time: 
…Japan will work together with the United States, the Republic of 
Korea, China, ASEAN countries, Australia, Russia, and other coun-
tries to build a better environment for shared growth and prosperity 
for the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. Economic partnership 
agreements (EPAs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) will be impor-
tant bridges in this regard. As part of this, we will look into participat-
ing in such negotiations as those for the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
agreement (TPP) and will aim to build a Free Trade Area of the Asia-
Pacific [FTAAP]. 
This sudden announcement of considering joining the TPP represented a 
“battle of estimates”̶the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry, and the Ministry of Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries had all released estimates ̶ that would spark a debate which 
divided public opinion. In response, the Kan cabinet issued its Basic Policy 
on Comprehensive Economic Partnerships (adopted by cabinet resolution 
on November 9, 2010), which asserted that: 1) “the networks of high-level 
EPA/FTAs formed by major trading countries are expanding” but that “Ja-
pan is falling behind”; 2) that the FTAAP is necessary to achieve the 
“strong economy” outlined in Japan’s New Growth Strategy (adopted by 
cabinet resolution on June 18, 2010); 3) that to realize the TPP, it is neces-
sary to have the resolve to “open up the country” (the “Heisei Opening”), 
and to do that, it is necessary to institute domestic reforms regarding the 
agricultural sector, the movement of people, and regulatory reforms. The 
basic policy of the Kan cabinet regarding the TPP is to continue to gather 
TPP-related data, commence negotiations with the countries concerned, 
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track public opinion on the issue, and make a decision by June of 2011 as 
to whether to join the TPP. 
Let us look now at the key features of the TPP. According to Kouichi 
Ishikawa (2010): 1) The TPP was an FTA among four countries (the P4: 
Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore) that entered into force in May 
of 2006, but with origins in an agreement formed in 2001 between New 
Zealand and Singapore. 2) It is a high-standard FTA, realizing wholly free 
trade, with no categories excepted. It is a comprehensive FTA that in-
cludes trade of goods and services, government procurement, intellectual 
property rights, and much more (investment is excluded), and it even has 
ancillary agreements concerning labor and the environment. 3) The reason 
it was named the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agree-
ment is that there was a strategic intent to expand it as an APEC FTA. 4) 
The TPP began to receive broader attention after President Obama an-
nounced in November of 2009 his administration’s commitment to joining 
the TPP. The goal of the U.S. in joining the TPP is to avoid being excluded 
from EPAs in East Asia. 5) One cause for concern is whether Vietnam, 
which is a high-tariff country, can achieve the high free-trade standard of 
eliminating 100 percent of its tariffs, which the partnership calls for. Fur-
thermore, there is the question of whether Malaysia, with its Bumiputra 
policy, can open up its government procurement system. Although Ishi-
kawa does not mention it, the TPP involves a total of nine countries when 
one adds the current member countries (the P4) and countries in negotia-
tions (five at present) to join. The countries and the size of their respective 
economies (nominal GDP in 2009; source: IMF) are as follows. 
1) Member countries: Brunei (USD 10 billion), Chile (USD 162 billion), 
New Zealand (USD 118 billion), and Singapore (USD 182 billion)
2) Negotiating countries: U.S. (USD 14,119 billion), Australia (USD 994 
billion), Peru (USD 127 billion), Malaysia (USD 193 billion), and Viet-
nam (USD 93 billion)
If Japan (USD 5.68 trillion) were to join the TPP, Japan and the U.S. 
alone (USD 19.187 trillion) would account for a combined 91.5 percent of 
the total (USD 20.973 trillion), making the partnership in essence a bilat-
eral FTA between the U.S. and Japan (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 28, 
2010). 
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Next, let us examine the Yokohama Vision presented at the 18th APEC 
Summit, which called for an “APEC community”. According to the Yokoha-
ma Vision, the “APEC community” envisioned is one that is: 1) tightly in-
tegrated (a “community that promotes stronger and deeper regional eco-
nomic integration”); 2) robust (a “community with higher quality growth”); 
3) secure (a “community that provides a more secure economic environ-
ment”), and that the way to create an APEC community is by realizing an 
FTAAP to serve as its foundation, one which should be pursued by devel-
oping regional partnerships such as ASEAN+3 (EAFTA), ASEAN+6 (CE-
PEA), the TPP, and others . In point of fact, the biggest issue at the 18th 
APEC Summit was finding ways to create an FTAAP that would bring 
about free trade throughout all of APEC’s 21 member economies (Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun, November 15, 2010). In addition, unlike the ASEAN+3 
(EAFTA) and ASEAN+6 (CEPEA) schemes, which have not advanced be-
yond the planning phases because of the struggles for leadership between 
China and Japan, the TPP is already in force and is actually functioning, 
at least among the P4. As the TPP may expand to nine members at the 
next summit (November 2011 at Hawaii, the US), and the strategic intent 
behind the TPP was to expand it to become a future APEC FTA, it is only 
natural that it has suddenly become the focus of much attention. The goal 
at the end of the pathway to creating an FTAAP through TPP is not an 
East Asian community, but an APEC community, so we must conclude that 
the goal has been fundamentally modified, i.e. the focus has been changed 
from regional cooperation in East Asia to regional cooperation along the 
Pacific Rim.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the future course that Japan 
should take regarding regional cooperation in light of the changes to the 
schemes addressed so far. In the second section below, I shall examine the 
motives of the U.S. in favoring schemes such as the TPP and FTAAP in re-
lation to how it intends to correct global imbalances that currently affect it 
(large deficits in its balance of payments). This naturally necessitates a 
discussion of efforts by China to address global imbalances affecting it 
(large surpluses in its balance of payments), as in this respect it is mirror 
image of the U.S. In the third section, I present an analysis of Japan’s 
economy in the wake of the global financial crisis, noting that the conven-
tional model of East Asian economic development (often called “triangular 
trade”) has reached its limits as regards to corrections to the trade imbal-
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ance between the U.S. and China. As such, initiatives to exploit demand 
within Asia and to develop the Mekong region have grown in importance. 
In the fourth and last section, I note that the TPP debate is arguably more 
of a political, diplomatic, and security issue than an economic one. I con-
clude by addressing how the TPP relates to the new National Defense Pro-
gram Guidelines and by discussing the path that Japan should take.
II. THE UNITED STATES’ STRATEGY FOR REDRESSING GLOBAL
IMBALANCES AND CHINA’S RESPONSE
1. U.S. strategy
The weight of the global economic crisis foreshadowed by the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 (commonly known in Japan as the 
“Lehman Shock”) led in fiscal 2009 to the first instance of negative global 
economic growth (-0.6%) in the last 60 years. The following is a breakdown 
of some of the figures for that year, with the growth figures in parenthe-
ses: developed countries (-3.2%) [the U.S. (-2.4%), the Euro Zone (-4.1%), 
Japan (-5.2%)], emerging Asian economies (6.6%) [China (8.7%), India 
(5.7%), and ASEAN5 (1.7%)].
As UNCTAD [2010] points out, the existence of global imbalances can 
be listed as one of the causes of the global economic crisis, a point which is 
widely acknowledged today. The developments leading up to the growth of 
global imbalances before the economic crisis are gradually being analyzed 
and elucidated. In short, these global imbalances can be summarized as a 
paired disequilibrium between the trade deficit of the U.S. and the trade 
surplus of East Asia, and particularly China. The deficit in the U.S. bal-
ance of current account (BOCA) in 2006 amounted to as much as 6 percent 
of its GDP, while China’s surplus was as much as 7 percent of its GDP. The 
U.S. deficit in BOCA is inextricably linked to its investment-savings bal-
ance. The corporate sector saw an excess in savings in the 2000s as a re-
sult of the collapse of the IT bubble, but the growing budget deficit 
spurred on by the Bush administration’s tax cuts and military spending, 
as well as the excessive consumer spending associated with the housing 
bubble, became the major factors that caused the U.S. to post significant 
deficit levels in BOCA. The U.S. BOCA was financed by East Asian coun-
tries (particularly China) that purchased U.S. Treasury securities with 
their foreign currency reserves increased via exports to the U.S. It is for 
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that reason that the two sides are often portrayed as mirror images of 
each other, but in fact neither position was sustainable. The lessons 
learned from the global economic crisis are at the heart of the intensity of 
calls to correct global imbalances, specifically the need for rebalancing.
The chief cause of the U.S. BOCA deficit is the excessive reliance on 
imports for consumer goods (Chart 1). The import of consumer goods is 
driven by individual consumption in the U.S. The country saw a drop in 
the household savings rate (nearly 0.0%) and a rise in consumer spending 
(71% of the GDP in 2009). Such growths in consumer spending, however, 
have proven unsustainable. The reason is that the increase in individual 
consumption was not supported by an increase in jobs or higher wages (i.e. 
an increase in compensation for labor), but instead was debt-financed, and 
essentially was “jobless-growth” (Chart 2). The factors that made it possi-
ble to finance consumer spending through debt instead of disposable in-
come were: 1) low interest rates, 2) inflated asset prices (housing prices in 
particular) that translated into a “asset effect”, and 3) financial deregula-
tion. With the global economic crisis consumer spending saw a sudden de-
cline. The reasons were: 1) a decrease in asset prices (housing prices in 
particular) that translated into a “negative asset effect”, 2) reluctance on 
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the part of financial institutions to extend loans or credit, and 3) unem-
ployment.
Testifying before the U.S. Senate Banking Committee, on July 21, 2010, 
Federal Reserve Board (FRB) Chairman Ben Bernanke said to the sur-
prise of many that the country’s economic outlook remained “unusually 
uncertain”. The reasons for this statement lie in falling housing prices, de-
clining bank credit, rising unemployment, and other indicators of the gen-
eral stagnation of the American economy. Bernanke testified, “An impor-
tant drag on household spending is the slow recovery in the labor market 
and the attendant uncertainty about job prospects.” This means that there 
are weak prospects for a self-sustaining recovery rooted in a recovery in 
the job market, leading in turn to increased consumer spending and home 
buying, more capital investment, and to greater credit lending by banks.
The strategy adopted by the Obama administration to extricate the 
U.S. economy and reduce its BOCA deficits is one of: 1) curbing the import 
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of consumer goods (especially from China), and 2) creating jobs by growing 
American exports.
With regard to the former, one tactic is to pressure China into revalu-
ing the yuan, but that has been met with resistance by China, leading to 
the new proposal of setting targets for BOCA. The U.S. suggested at the 
G20 Summit (October 22 & 23, 2010, at Gyeongju, South Korea) placing a 
limit on current account deficits and surpluses at no more than 4 percent 
of a nation’s GDP. As of 2009, in terms of the GDP of the larger G20 coun-
tries, those running a surplus were, in descending order: Saudi Arabia 
(6.1%), China (6.0%), South Korea (5.1%), Germany (4.0%), and Japan 
(2.8%). Those running a deficit were: Australia (-4.4%), India (-2.9%), the 
U.S. (-2.7%), France (-1.9%), and the UK (-1.1%). In terms of future pros-
pects for BOCA as a function of GDP (changes from 2010 to 2015), the fig-
ures are: China (4.7% to 7.8%), Germany (6.1% to 3.9%), the U.S. (-3.2% to 
-3.3%), and Japan (3.1% to 1.9%). Based on the facts described above, the 
American proposal has been seen as an indirect tactic targeting China ̶
as direct appeals to revaluate the yuan have failed̶ designed to get the 
country to tighten the reins on its trade surpluses and decrease its exports 
by revaluating its currency (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 23, 2010).
The Obama administration’s National Export Initiative falls under 
the latter strategy. In his 2010 State of the Union Address (January 27, 
2010), President Obama stated, 
...we need to export more of our goods, because the more products we 
make and sell to other countries, the more jobs we support right here 
in America. So tonight, we set a new goal: We will double our exports 
over the next five years, an increase that will support two million jobs 
in America.
Actually, President Obama foreshadowed this initiative in earlier remarks 
made in Tokyo (November 14, 2009 at Suntory Hall), where he touched on 
the need to correct global imbalances by saying, “One of the important les-
sons this recession [brought about by the global crisis] has taught us is the 
limits of depending primarily on American consumers and Asian exports 
to drive growth…” He went on to say that 
...in the United States, this new strategy [for economic growth] will 
The East Asian Economies after the Global Economic Crisis and the Course Japan Should Take（NISHIGUCHI）2011】 17
mean that we save more and spend less, reform our financial systems, 
reduce our long-term deficit and borrowing. It will also mean a great-
er emphasis on exports that we can build, produce, and sell all over 
the world. For America, this is a jobs strategy. Right now, our exports 
support millions upon millions of well-paying American jobs. Increas-
ing those exports by just a small amount has the potential to create 
millions more.
It is in precisely this context that we should seek to understand the 
motives of the U.S. in supporting the TPP, FTAAP, and APEC community. 
At the most recent APEC CEO Summit (November 13, 2010), President 
Obama: 1) expressed a desire to improve domestic employment by leverag-
ing more exports to Asia by saying, “In this region, the United States sees 
a huge opportunity to increase our exports in some of the fastest-growing 
markets in the world,” and also 2) implicitly addressed correcting global 
imbalances by calling on countries with large surplus (such as China and 
Japan) to take steps to grow their domestic demand, saying, “...going for-
ward, no nation should assume that their path to prosperity is simply 
paved with exports to America.” Underlying this speech is an awareness of 
the struggles over leadership in economic cooperation and integration in 
the Asia-Pacific region. As Robert Schollay (2010) has noted, in the East 
Asian region, where growth has been remarkably strong, the U.S. harbors 
strong concerns over the progress of any regional economic integration ini-
tiative that would exclude it (ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6), and through the 
TPP it has made clear its strong intent to maintain and deepen its eco-
nomic involvement in East Asia. The U.S. strategy for trans-Pacific region-
al integration is to leverage an American-led TPP to create an FTAAP and 
use that as a basis for an APEC community. This American strategy, as 
Peng Hong Cai [2010] has pointed out, also represents an attempt to keep 
China’s growing power in East Asia and the Pacific Rim in check. In that 
sense, it must be kept in mind that the TPP issue is not merely one of eco-
nomics, but also an issue that has political, diplomatic, and security di-
mensions. 
2. The Chinese response
As UNCTAD (2010) has outlined, the main issues that China faces 
are redressing its external imbalances (large surpluses in BOCA) and in-
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ternal imbalances (between consumption and investment). More than 30 
years have passed since China embarked on its path of economic reforms 
(its policy of “reform and openness”) in 1978, an investment and export-led 
growth path that has brought about phenomenal economic development 
for the country.
There is a reason that China’s policy-makers emphasized the role of 
exports after its economic reforms. That is, per capita income in China was 
low, hence there was a limit to what could be achieved through domestic 
demand. It is common knowledge that China’s exports have driven domes-
tic production. Exports backed by foreign investment have increased the 
country’s labor productivity, and that high level of productivity has al-
lowed it to lower prices, become more competitive globally, and in turn ex-
pand its exports. On the other hand, China’s exports have been dominated 
by imported intermediate goods, with domestic added value accounting for 
only around half of its total revenues. The fact that domestic added value 
makes up such a relatively small share of exports is a reflection of the 
small degree to which exports have contributed to job creation in China. In 
fact, in 2007, there were only 70 million people employed in China’s export 
sector, which amounts to less than 10 percent of China’s entire workforce 
and only about 20 percent of wages and compensation.
Rates of individual consumption in China ̶regardless of whether 
they are viewed on a per capita or a GDP basis̶ are low by international 
standards. Per capita consumption in 2008 was a mere USD 758. Low and 
declining levels of individual consumption is a phenomenon not limited to 
China; it is common among rapidly industrializing countries during their 
economic takeoff periods. In fact, both Japan and South Korea experienced 
periods lasting roughly two decades after their economic takeoffs in which 
consumer spending levels fell, after which those ratios went on to turn 
around and rise. The main reasons were capital accumulation for the pur-
poses of industrialization and high rates of gross fixed capital formation. 
What is peculiar about China is that, unlike Japan or South Korea, in the 
mid-2000s, even after 25 years had passed since its economic takeoff, the 
ratio of individual consumption fell sharply against the GDP, while the in-
vestment ratio surged (Chart 3). One can give two reasons for the drop in 
individual consumption rates. One is a high marginal propensity to save 
in household saving habits. This stems from employment instability and 
limited funds for expenditures on government medical care, education, 
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and pension plans following the reforms to state-owned enterprises in the 
mid-1990s. In other words, the social security system is still inadequate in 
China. The other reason involves the profits of state-owned enterprises. 
Compensation for labor peaked in the mid-1990s and then fell, which was 
caused by an increase in the profits of state-owned enterprises relative to 
the national income, while in contrast household incomes fell relative to 
the same (i.e. an imbalance between employee compensation and corpo-
rate profits). This is in part due to structural changes that occurred in the 
Chinese economy. After the mid-1990s, the value added by China’s agricul-
tural sector dropped, while the value added by the industrial and service 
sectors rose. However, due to the reforms to state-owned enterprises, wag-
es in the latter sectors decreased. Furthermore, the contribution by foreign 
companies to job creation and wage increases was low. In addition, since 
there was an abundant supply of laborers willing to work at low-wages 
(unlimited supply of labor), growth in employee wages was held in check. 
Hence, savings rates in the household and corporate sectors that even ex-
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ceeded the high investment ratio resulted in large surpluses in BOCA on 
one hand and imbalances between consumption and investment on the 
other.
Let us take a closer look at trade by China as it relates to global im-
balances. Francoise Lemoine [2010] holds that the performance of Chinese 
exports over the past 30 plus years has been outstanding. China made 
particularly significant advances in trade in the 2000s. For the period from 
2001 to 2008, the annual average growth rate was 24 percent for exports 
and 22 percent for imports. As for China’s share of global trade, its exports 
and imports took up 9.0 percent and 7.0 percent respectively in 2008. Chi-
na’s share of the world’s manufactured exports grew rapidly from 1.4 per-
cent in 1990 to 4.4 percent in 2000 and to 12.6 percent in 2007. This was 
not merely a growth in volume. It represented a major transition in the 
makeup of China’s exports from its traditional exports (textiles, clothing, 
toys, and miscellaneous goods) to more high-tech exports. For example, the 
ratio of electronics to the total went from 13 percent in 1995 to 21 percent 
in 2000 and 30 percent in 2007, while at the same time the proportion of 
textiles fell, going from 33 percent in 1995 to 26 percent in 2000, dropping 
all the way to 17 percent in 2007.
The chief driver of trade by China has been processing trade, for 
which China has become a global production center. International manu-
facturing has become more modularized since the 1990s, and with this 
trend, labor-intensive processes have been relocated from high-wage to 
low-wage countries. Amidst this new international division of labor, China 
has become a major base for global production. In terms of processing 
trade versus ordinary trade, the former has made major gains against the 
latter: for exports, processing trade rose from 5 percent vs. 95 percent in 
1981 to 51 percent vs. 44 percent in 2007, and for imports, it grew from 7 
percent vs. 93 percent in 1981 to 39 percent vs. 45 percent in 2007 (Chart 
4). China’s processing trade has the following characteristics:
1) Processed exports contain many imported components. The overwhelm-
ing majority of China’s high-tech exports are attributable to assembly 
of high-tech parts.
2) Processing trade accounts for the majority of China’s export surpluses.
3) Processing trade is characterized by geographical asymmetry in China’s 
balance of trade. Specifically, components and intermediate goods are 
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imported from other Asian countries, and finished goods are exported to 
the U.S. and EU. In this triangular trade model, China has a trade defi-
cit with other Asian countries but a trade surplus with the U.S. and EU.
In spite of these phenomenal achievements, there are also serious 
flaws in trade by China. First, China’s trade sector has two very distinct 
tiers. Chinese companies (both private and state-owned) play only a limit-
ed role in processing trade and are mostly engaged in ordinary trade. 
Hence, local subsidiaries of foreign companies are overwhelmingly respon-
sible for the export of high-tech products, and the gap in technological ca-
pabilities between foreign and domestic companies is widening. Second, 
overseas trade operations are concentrated along the China’s coastal are-
as. Despite making up only 35 percent of China’s GDP in 2007, the five ar-
eas comprising Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong Province, Jiangsu Province, 
and Zhejiang Province accounted for 73 percent of the country’s foreign 
trade (66% in 1995). In terms of reliance on trade, these five areas repre-
sented 124 percent, the coastal areas as a whole represented 93 percent, 
and inland China 13 percent (Chart 5). This concentration of trade opera-
tions along the coast is inhibiting the spread inland of technological inno-
vation and profits derived from foreign trade. Third, Chinese exports are 
characterized by an unrelenting specialization in downmarket products. 
By combining high levels of productivity using imported technologies and 
capital with low-wage labor, Chinese exports have attained an extremely 
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Chart 4. China’s Processing and Ordinary Trade (%ofTotalExportsorImports)
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high degree of global competitiveness. China still specializes in supplying 
the world with low-priced products. In 2003, 72 percent of Chinese exports 
were low-priced products, 17 percent were mid-ranged, and 11 percent 
were high-cost products. The makeup of Chinese exports is such that even 
high-tech products are concentrated in the lower price ranges (Chart 6). 
For this reason, the unit value of Chinese exports is extremely low, 
amounting to about one-third that of products from Japan and the EU. 
This is one reason that the undervalued renminbi (a weak yuan) can sup-
port low-priced Chinese exports. On the other hand, imports to China are 
Share in China’s
GDP (%)
Share in China’s foreign
trade (%) Foreign trade in percent of GDP
China 100 100 66
Beijing 4 4 67
Shanghai 5 13 171
Jiangsu 10 17 110
Zhejiang 7 9 81
Guangdong 12 30 160
Five provinces above 35 73 124
Coastal area 59 91 92
Inland area 41 9 13
（Source）Francoise Lemoine, op. cit., p.10.
Chart 5. The Five Provinces Leading China’s Foreign Trade, 2007
1995 2003
China Total exports
High-price products 10 11
Medium-price products 20 17
Low-price products 70 72
Total trade 100 100
India Total exports
High-price products 15 18
Medium-price products 29 26
Low-price products 56 56
Total trade 100 100
（Source）Francoise Lemoine, op. cit., p.11.
Chart 6. China’s and India’s Exports by Price/Quality Range: Share of Low, Medi-
um and High Price Products in Total Exports (in Percent)
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mostly mid-ranged and high-priced products. Due to this scissor effect be-
tween imports and exports, the fourth problem is that Chinese terms of 
trade rapidly deteriorated (Chart 7). Between 1997 and 2005, the price of 
Chinese exports to the U.S. fell 1.5 percent annually, but the cost of im-
ports rose by more than that. China’s foreign capital-dependent export-ori-
ented industrialization policies mobilized low-wage labor to the export sec-
tor and penetrated the world’s markets for low-priced products. This has, 
however, allowed developed nations to avoid competition in high-priced 
product markets, and to enjoy favorable terms of trade by importing low-
priced products. As a result, the fifth problem is that in the 2000s, the ex-
ternal imbalances and internal imbalances became much more pro-
nounced. Because the increase in Chinese exports proceeded much more 
rapidly than domestic production and domestic economic activities, the 
country became increasingly dependent upon foreign demand. In 2007 the 
dependence on foreign trade reached 66 percent, and the trade surplus 
had reached 7 percent of the GDP. China’s large surplus in BOCA, i.e. its 
global imbalance, is a reflection of its domestic imbalance. As foreign de-
mand (exports) increased, the link between domestic private consumption 
and the Chinese economy weakened. The ratio of household consumption 
to GDP fell from 46 percent in 2000 to 35 percent in 2007, but the invest-
ment ratio reached 40 percent. In these respects, China’s economic devel-
opment has become based on a model of unbalanced growth biased toward 
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（Source）Francoise Lemoine, op. cit., p.12.
Chart 7. Evolution of China’s Export and Import Unit Value and Terms of Trade (1995=1)
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exports and investment. Such an economic development model is far from 
sustainable.
It should also be noted that the leaders of China themselves are well 
aware that its current economic development model, namely the invest-
ment- and export-driven development model, is unsustainable. Not long 
ago (October 27, 2010), the Communist Party of China published through 
the state-run Xinhua News Agency an outline of its 12th Five-Year Plan 
(2011̶2015). The plan was adopted at the Fifth Plenum of the 17th Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Party of China, which concluded on Oc-
tober 18, 2010. The main goals are as follows (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Oc-
tober 28, 2010):
1) To make the rate of increase in household revenues and incomes the 
same as the GDP growth rate
2) To achieve major decreases in energy consumed to generate the same 
monetary amount in GDP
3) To commence levying an environmental protection tax
4) To study ways to push through real estate tax reform
5) To create mechanisms to handle labor disputes
6) To protect maritime interests
The direction that the new Five-Year Plan seeks to take is first to ac-
celerate the shift in its economic course to one that values the quality of 
economic growth over the rate of economic growth. Second, the plan seeks 
to achieve growth that strikes a good balance between environmental con-
cerns and the correction of regional disparities and gaps between the rich 
and poor. This is symbolized by the plan’s stated goal of “development 
marked by harmony between people and nature”. Third, the plan strives to 
reduce China’s dependence on exports and switch over from a model of ex-
port-driven growth to one driven by domestic demand and higher domestic 
consumption.
It is interesting to note that, as Yuji Miura (2010) has already pointed 
out, the goals of the new Five-Year Plan outlined above were things that 
were previously incorporated into the 11th Five-Year Plan. The previous 
plan was rooted in the strategic notion of creating a “Harmonious Society”, 
which was viewed as a logical extension of the “Scientific Development 
Concept” and “Common Prosperity” vision. Based on this notion, the old 
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plan called for: 1) a transition to domestic demand-led growth, 2) the tran-
sition to a recycling-based economy, 3) the transition to a high value-added 
economy, 4) the creation of a Harmonious Society, and 5) the further ad-
vancement of economic reforms and “openness”.
The failure to meet these goals was tied to the global economic crisis. 
To overcome the effects of the crisis, China introduced a major economic 
stimulus package worth RMB four trillion, and by doing so was able to ef-
fect a recovery in growth levels, but the growth model remained dependent 
upon investment and exports, as it had been before. As a result, numerous 
side effects of this model began to manifest themselves in more serious 
ways. For example, dependence upon investment brought about a real es-
tate bubble, environmental destruction through overdevelopment, the 
squandering of resources, the widening of economic gaps between rich and 
poor and among different regions, and others, while the continued depend-
ence on exports led to increased exposure to vulnerabilities brought about 
by fluctuations in external demand (and as a consequence a loss of jobs 
and output), trade friction, increased pressure to revalue the currency, and 
many more. The new Five-Year Plan seeks again to create the Harmonious 
Society by achieving Common Prosperity, but the key to that is the transi-
tion to an economic growth model driven by domestic demand, and in par-
ticular the growth of household consumption. To that end, fundamental re-
forms in the civil sector, such as increasing labor’s share of income, 
improvements to social security programs, etc. are essential. The Chinese 
economy is at a crossroads, and its path will be determined by whether it 
can make the transition to a domestic demand-led economic growth model 
so that it can simultaneously correct external and internal imbalances.
III. JAPAN’S ECONOMY IN THE WAKE OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS
1. The problem of triangular trade in the Asia-Pacific region
The two biggest factors in the development of the economies of East 
Asia before the global economic crisis were the formation of modularized 
networks of international production and the practice of triangular trade. 
As Chart 8 ”Major Flow of Intermediate Goods and Finished Goods in Asia 
(Electrical / Electronic) “ shows, in the period from 1998 to 2008, the ex-
ports of intermediate goods from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and ASEAN 
countries to China and Hong Kong increased by a factor of 3.2, 10.9, 4.9, 
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and 9.8, respectively. Meanwhile, exports to the U.S. and EU of finished 
goods assembled in China and Hong Kong from imported intermediate 
parts also saw a major jump during this period, increasing by a factor of 
5.9. However, the decline in demand in Western economies brought about 
by the global economic crisis caused a massive drop in exports from East 
Asia to the U.S. and EU. Thus, the limitations of development based on the 
conventional triangular trade pattern were exposed. 
Masahiro Kawai (2010) holds that: 1) the recent global economic crisis 
means that it has become nearly impossible for Japan to sustain growth 
that is led by foreign demand dependent upon western markets and the 
country must therefore make the transition to an internal demand-driven 
economic development model, but 2) because Japan is plagued by the prob-
lem of an aging population and low birth rates, domestic demand will not 
be enough to sustain growth, so the country should incorporate the vitality 
of the rapidly growing markets in Asia, i.e. internal Asian demand, by pur-
suing regional economic integration with Asia. He also identifies the fol-
䕿Division of labor is making particular progress in the electrical/electronic fields. Over the past 10 years, 
exports of finished goods from China and South Korea to Europe and the United States have increased about 
6-fold.
䕿Japan's exports of intermediate goods have expanded, but its share in the world's intermediate goods exports 
to East Asia has decreased. There has been an increase in establishment of local production bases.
㹃㹓
䛭䛾௚
%
100%
Model flow of assembling parts in Asia and exporting the 
finished goods to Europe and the United States Electrical/Electronic
Regional Shares of the Export Value of the 
World's Intermediate Goods to East Asia 
(Major Products)
Major Flow of Intermediate Goods and Finished Goods in Asia (Electrical/Electronic) Others
EU
㤶 
⡿ᅜ
70%
80%
90
United 
States
Hong Kong
1.6 times
5.9 times 䠄124.4 ĸ21.1)
䠄23.3 ĸ14.4)14.4)
21.1)
୰ᅜ
㡑ᅜ
ྎ‴
40%
50%
60%
South 
Korea
 
Taiwan
China
1.1 times (27.4ĸ24.2).
ASEAN
᪥ᮏ
20%
30%
ASEAN5
Japan
5
0%
10%
㻝㻥
㻥㻜
㻝㻥
㻥㻞
㻝㻥
㻥㻠
㻝㻥
㻥㻢
㻝㻥
㻥㻤
㻞㻜
㻜㻜
㻞㻜
㻜㻞
㻞㻜
㻜㻠
㻞㻜
㻜㻢
㻞㻜
㻜㻤
Japan's share
ĸ
 
1990: 30.7%
Ļ
2007: 15.6%
Flow of final goods Flow of intermediate goods
2008 ĸ 1998
* Electric/electronic machinery export value ($ billion)
ĸ
Flow of finished  goods
China/
Hong Kong
Europe/
United 
States
Japan
South 
Korea
Taiwan
1.3 times (19.1ĸ15.1)ASEAN
2.1 times(35.1ĸ16.8)
(43.8ĸ4.5)9.8 times
4.5)
2008 ĸ 1998
3.2 times (36.7ĸ11.6)
Chart 8. Presence of China and South Korea increasing in the electrical/electronic fields
（Source）METI (The Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry), White Paper of 
International Trade and Economy 2010, p.174.
The East Asian Economies after the Global Economic Crisis and the Course Japan Should Take（NISHIGUCHI）2011】 27
lowing five challenges as important to the future of Asia:
1) The development of broad regional infrastructures in Asia (ADB, Infra-
structure for a Seamless Asia, 2009)
2) The promotion of a “Green New Deal” for Asia: Utilizing Japanese envi-
ronmental technologies
3) The reinforcement of social security policies such as medical care, 
health care, and education in Asia’s emerging economies
4) The formation of region-wide economic partnerships encompassing all 
of East Asia
5) The stabilization of currencies and finance in Asia
2. Incorporating internal demand in Asia into Japan’s economy 
and developing the Mekong region
Faced with new problems and economic conditions in the wake of the 
global economic crisis, the Japanese government and business community 
(and particularly the Japan Business Federation, or Nippon Keidanren) 
responded immediately and launched new policies. Two key components of 
these policies were: 1) incorporating internal demand in Asia into Japan’s 
economy, and 2) developing the Mekong region. The former entails taking 
the production networks that have been formed in East Asia so far, trans-
forming them into production and sales networks, and leveraging them to 
expand the consumer markets in East Asia. Mekong development, on the 
other hand, involves building infrastructures in East Asia in order to facil-
itate economic integration and correct economic disparities in the region 
(i.e. overcoming the so-called “ASEAN divide”).
In a speech titled “Overcoming the Economic Crisis to Rekindle a Rap-
idly Developing Asia” (May 21, 2009, Tokyo), then Prime Minister Taro Aso 
put forth the Asian Growth Initiative (a plan to double the scale of Asia’s 
economy by 2020 by providing aid to Asia in the form of ODA grants and 
loans totaling USD 67 billion). The argument presented was that Asian 
economies, which have till now been driven by exports, should be shifted to 
internal demand-based economies, but to do so it would be necessary to 
enlarge Asia’s middle class by creating broad regional infrastructures and 
improving social security and education systems. Particular emphasis was 
placed on Mekong region development (Chart 9). 
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama also placed a high priority on the de-
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velopment of the Mekong region. Hatoyama held the first Japan-Mekong 
Summit Meeting (November 7, 2009, Tokyo), where he stated, “…I believe 
that with regard to the manner in which we redress intraregional gaps 
and develop jointly, the Mekong region will hold the key in the open and 
transparent East Asian community initiative that I have been advocat-
ing,” and proposed what would become the Japan-Mekong Action Plan 63, 
and initiative pledging JPY 500 billion in ODA over three years to assist 
with development in the Mekong region.
At the same time, members of the Japanese business community have 
likewise come up with ambitious proposals. Nippon Keidanren, in a propos-
al titled “Overcoming Crisis, Opening a Path from Asia to Global Economic 
Growth” (October 20, 2009), expressed its belief in the potential for sus-
tained growth in Asia, noting its 1) expectations for Asia playing not only 
the role of the “Factory of the World”, but also new roles as an “end consum-
er market”. The proposal also expressed the view that growth of the middle 
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class has been remarkable in China, India and ASEAN countries, but that 
it is important for Asia to make the transition to internal demand-led econ-
omies by cultivating regional (i.e. intra-Asian) demand, and to achieve this, 
2) “market expansion and trade investment stimulation through the pro-
motion of regional economy integration, and the resolution of bottlenecks 
for growth by developing both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ infrastructures, are re-
quired.” Nippon Keidanren subsequently issued a proposal called “Toward 
Realization of the Action Plans for Asian Economic Growth” (November 17, 
2009), which outlined the following seven steps of action:
1) Promote regional economic integration to facilitate economic activities. 
Expand the coverage of and improve the economic network formed by 
accumulated comprehensive EPAs and FTAs.
2) Provide stable medium- and long-term funding. Make efforts to prevent 
another financial crisis and to stabilize Asian currencies. To create mar-
kets for the issuance and distribution of bonds and other securities in 
Asia and facilitate the circulation of the massive private savings in the 
Asian region as investments.
3) Advance broad regional infrastructure development. Take steps to re-
dress intraregional economic gaps by creating region-wide distribution 
infrastructures, thereby paving the way for the deployment of interna-
tional production networks.
4) Enhance the development of “soft” infrastructures, including legal sys-
tems, mechanisms for training human resources, and technological co-
operation schemes.
5) Boost demand within Asia. Domestic demand is growing with the rapid 
rise of the middle class in Asia. Take steps to transform economies into 
those fueled by domestic demand-led growth.
6) Balance environmental concerns and economic growth.
7) Promote the reform of Japan's ODA and other official flows.
Nippon Keidanren has also released a proposal concerning infrastruc-
ture creation called “Promoting Regional Infrastructure Development for a 
Prosperous Asia” (March 16, 2010) (Chart 10).
One work that can be cited as the most comprehensive amalgam to 
date of the plans of the Japanese government and business community 
(Nippon Keidanren) that we have looked at so far is the Comprehensive 
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Asian Development Plan (CADP), compiled by ERIA. As mentioned above, 
CADP was submitted by the Japanese delegation at the 5th East Asia 
Summit (October 30, 2010, Hanoi). Fukunari Kimura (2010), one of the re-
searchers central to the drafting of CADP, argued that production net-
works unique to East Asia have formed in the region, and that we are see-
ing increasingly advanced stages in the agglomeration of industry and the 
fragmentation of production processes. Nevertheless, according to Kimura, 
the degrees of both economic development and economic disparity in East 
Asia are large, and CADP aims to incorporate international production 
networks in areas that have fallen behind in economic performance and to 
correct East Asia’s economic disparities. From our perspective, however, 
this is a typical example of a public-private sector partnership. To begin 
with, one can conclude that the motives of the Japanese government are to 
revive and revitalize the Japanese economy by including Asia and Japa-
nese government projects in Asia as one of the main pillars of its New 
Growth Strategy (adopted by cabinet resolution on June 18, 2010), which 
consists of 21 government projects in seven fields. Next, given that the 
more than 600 individual projects called for to achieve CADP’s goal of dou-
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bling the scale of the economies of Asia ̶projects that are worth a stag-
gering total of about USD 290 billion (roughly JPY 25 trillion)̶ the goal 
of the business community is likely to seize as many business opportuni-
ties as possible while receiving government aid for market development 
and infrastructure construction projects in East Asia. Investment funds 
are expected to fall short particularly for broad regional infrastructure de-
velopment projects such as the one in the Mekong region, so the idea is to 
cover those funds through public-private partnerships (PPPs). It is proba-
bly no secret to many that behind these PPP projects lurks a strong desire 
to “regain ground” from China, which is increasing its presence and influ-
ence in East Asia, particularly in the Mekong region.
IV. PROSPECTS
Though originating in the United States, the economic crisis has had 
a tremendous impact on the global economy, and particularly the econo-
mies of East Asia. This was because the U.S. was by far the world’s great-
est consumer (Chart 11-1 and Chart 11-2). The monetary amount of U.S. 
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Chart 11-1. HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES AND 
COUNTRY GROUPS, AVERAGE FOR 2007–2008 (Billions of dollars)
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Chart 11-2. PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE AND 
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The East Asian Economies after the Global Economic Crisis and the Course Japan Should Take（NISHIGUCHI）2011】 33
consumption before the crisis accounted for about 16 percent of the world’s 
total production output, with a significant portion of it attributable to im-
ports. During the period from 2000 to 2007, the U.S. dependence on 
imports rose from 15 to 17 percent, creating an increase in global demand 
equivalent to USD 987 billion. Hence, a decrease in American consump-
tion translates into a global decline in production and exports to the U.S.
UNCTAD (2010) has studied the effects of declines in U.S. consumer 
demand on the global economy and has determined that it causes two seri-
ous problems. The first involves the question of which countries are able to 
take up the slack caused by downturns in U.S. consumption. If levels of 
consumption are scored on a scale of zero to 100 where the U.S. scores 100, 
China’s score is a mere 20, meaning that it cannot make up for U.S. de-
clines. Another problem lies in the makeup of imports. While U.S. imports 
are dominated by consumer goods, the imports of China and emerging 
economies are mostly made up of producer goods and raw materials, ener-
gy supplies, foods and such, so structurally speaking it is a leap to expect 
such countries to make up for declines in American consumption. The 
UNCTAD (2010) report presented a bleak outlook, namely that the world 
economy after the global economic crisis will not be able to recover easily 
from the deflationary trend caused by the stagnation in trade and output.
The UNCTAD (2010) report makes a very valid point in that in the 
framework of the U.S.-China trade imbalance it is hard to argue for decou-
pling, leaving coupling as the favorable alternative. Nevertheless, as noted 
in the White Paper on International Economy and Trade of METI (2010 
Edition), the middle-income population of Asia (households with a disposa-
ble income from USD five thousand to 35 thousand) is rapidly growing, 
jumping from 220 million in 2002 to 940 million in 2010. This segment is 
expected to reach two billion people in 2020 (Chart 12). The UNCTAD 
(2010) report is undoubtedly correct in concluding that China alone cannot 
take up the equivalent slack caused by a drop in U.S. individual consump-
tion levels. However, as Chart 13 “Asian region expected to become the 
world’s major consumer market” shows, if we take 2008 as an example, the 
value of U.S. consumption was USD 9.86 trillion, while the total for all of 
Asia (which here refers to Japan, China, NIES3 [South Korea, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong], ASEAN nations, and India) reached USD 6.62 trillion, or 
67.1 percent of the U.S. figure. Furthermore, when one looks at the project-
ed figures for 2020, Asia is expected to surpass the U.S., with USD 15.78 
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High income population in Asia (excluding Japan) toAsia's middle income population will more than
䕿Middle-income population in Asia is expected to swell to 2 billion. High-income 
population in Asia excluding Japan will exceed that of Japan within the next 5 years.
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䕿China is expected to overtake Japan to become Asia's largest consumer market by 2020.             
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䕿Business opportunities will further increase for the Japanese industry.
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Chart 12. Middle- and high-income segments expanding in Asia
Chart 13. Asian region expected to become the “world’s major consumer market”
The East Asian Economies after the Global Economic Crisis and the Course Japan Should Take（NISHIGUCHI）2011】 35
trillion for the U.S. and USD 16.14 trillion for Asia. Given these data, Ja-
pan should choose a course in which it joins Asia in its growth, contributes 
to it, and together enjoys the fruits of prosperity in the 21st century. To this 
end, however, it is necessary to overcome the bottlenecks created by under-
developed infrastructures (industrial, lifestyle-related, and logistics infra-
structures; specifically, those for energy [power], communications, trans-
port [airports, harbors, railways, and roads], and running water and 
sanitation). According to a study by the ADB (2009), over the 2011 to 2020 
period about USD eight trillion in infrastructure investments will be need-
ed (Chart 14), and if such investment is provided the real income of devel-
oping countries in Asia would be raised by about USD 13 trillion.
It is necessary for Japan to take steps toward regional cooperation (re-
gional integration) for a harmonious and mutually prosperous future with 
the growing and thriving countries of Asia, and especially the countries of 
East Asia, with which Japan already has close economic ties. To do so, Ja-
pan should work to build an East Asian community. It is with this ideal in 
mind that I wish to revisit the issue of the TPP and conclude this exami-
䕿Infrastructure needs are expected to build up in Asia in line with urbanization ($8 trillion               
by 2020).
䕿Infrastructure development is expected to bring significant economic benefits through 
upgrading industrial clusters and forming efficient industrial corridors
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Chart 14.  Infrastructure Development to Promote Growth in Asia
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nation.
First, it would be worth examining the historical developments in 
terms of regional cooperation (regional integration) in the Pacific Rim that 
have led up to the TPP. Keeping in mind that the latter half of the 1980s 
saw a rise in a tendency toward regionalism across the globe, which culmi-
nated in the 1990s in the formation of the EU (1992) and NAFTA (1993), 
the first leader to propose regional cooperation in East Asia was then 
Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir Mohamad. In 1990 Mahathir put 
forth a concept called the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG). The idea 
behind the EAEG was to form an East Asian economic zone that excluded 
the U.S.
Facing such developments, the U.S. was forced to rethink its strategies 
for East Asia. The U.S. response, delivered by then Secretary of State 
James Baker, was one that was severely critical of Mahathir’s vision, call-
ing the EAEG “drawing a line down the middle of the Pacific” and separat-
ing the United States from East Asia. The U.S. is located at the conceptual 
“hub of the wheel” that forms the Asia-Pacific region, with the U.S.-Japan 
alliance forming the hub, the U.S.-Korean alliance to the north, the ASE-
AN nations to the south, and further to the south is the alliance with Aus-
tralia. The structure of this strategic framework is such that when its 
spokes are connected to the whole the common interests represented by 
APEC emerge. Put differently, because the U.S. has vital interests in the 
Asia-Pacific region, it was unable to accept the EAEG, from which it was 
excluded, so instead it proposed APEC, and leveraging its powerful mili-
tary might it sought to restructure and strengthen alliances and make up 
for the influence it had lost in the region.
After the strategic announcement by Secretary Baker, APEC was sud-
denly pushed to the center of the limelight. It is a well-known fact that af-
ter the 5th APEC ministerial meeting held in 1993 in Seattle under strong 
pressure from President Bill Clinton (which was also the first informal 
summit), APEC, which was still a loose deliberative body that had only 
formed a few years earlier in 1989 and did not yet to have the substance 
befitting an economic cooperation organization, was thrust into a central 
role within the United States’ Pacific Rim policy. One fact we must not 
overlook here is that APEC was originally conceived as a deliberative body 
for the purpose of international economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
region, but it has since come to be perceived in U.S. strategy as an integral 
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part of the country’s security policy. Furthermore, the exact same thing 
could be said of APEC even after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
socialist states of the Eastern Bloc from 1989 to 1991 ̶i.e. the end of the 
Cold War̶ with respect to U.S. policy in East Asia. 
In February of 1995 the U.S. Department of Defense laid out its stra-
tegic vision for East Asia (called the “United States Security Strategy for 
the East Asia-Pacific Region”). This strategy was developed under then As-
sistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Dr. Joseph 
Nye, and is often referred to as the “Nye Initiative”. The main points of 
this strategic vision were: 1) that the U.S. had become increasingly de-
pendent upon the economic opportunities (trade, investment, employment, 
etc.) provided by economic development in East Asia; 2) the American se-
curity presence and bilateral military alliances had helped provide the 
"oxygen" for East Asian development, 3) to support security commitments 
and ensure economic development in East Asia, the U.S. would maintain a 
force of around 100,000 military personnel (47,000 in Japan and 36,000 in 
South Korea). It is clear from this document that economic and security 
matters were viewed as one issue, or two sides to the same coin.
The next major development in regional cooperation in East Asia 
came in 1997 with the Asian financial crisis. The IMF, which was under 
the strong influence of the United States, issued the wrong “prescription” 
for the problem, which only worsened the crisis. This led to unprecedented 
levels of distrust in the IMF and the U.S. and exposed the incompetence 
and wholly dysfunctional nature of APEC, which led in December of 1997 
to the 1st ASEAN+3 Summit and the beginning of a new form of regional 
cooperation that was capable of dealing with the crisis. The structure of 
the ASEAN+3 was more or less the same as that of EAEG, and in fact was 
viewed as a resurrection of EAEG. I have already noted that not only the 
ASEAN countries but also China has put its support behind this ASE-
AN+3 framework. Japan, on the other hand, though it is a participant in 
ASEAN+3, supports the ASEAN+6 scheme following the East Asia Sum-
mit forum that began in 2005. The reason for the addition of three addi-
tional countries (India, Australia, and New Zealand) to ASEAN+3 was 
two-fold: Japan wanted to offset the expansion of Chinese influence in 
ASEAN+3 by adding another major power, namely India, and 2) the inclu-
sion of Australia and New Zealand ̶and particularly Australia given its 
alliance with the U.S.̶ would allow Japan to save face when deferring to 
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the U.S., which is characteristic of Japanese diplomacy, by letting another 
country act as a surrogate voice for wishes of the U.S. As these two points 
illustrate, Japan places a high priority on relations with the U.S. even in 
the context of creating an East Asian community.
In his paper “Observations at the Yokohama APEC Summit on the 
past, present, and future of the Asia-Pacific region” (in Japanese), Akio 
Watanabe (2010) argues that the options in front of us can be boiled down 
to two choices: following the Asia-Pacific cause or the East Asia cause. He 
asserts that if we view the matter from a higher-order, broader perspec-
tive, the correct choice is to follow the Asia-Pacific cause (i.e. the APEC-
sided view), because, he states, since the 1960s economic development in 
the Asia-Pacific region has been possible because of the generally stable 
international climate, and the foundation for that has been the ability of 
the U.S. to guarantee security, as well as the existence of the Japan-U.S. 
security arrangement. As Nobuhiro Suzuki (2010) and others have 
warned, it will not just be agriculture that suffers losses in the TPP. Its ef-
fects will be seen in no small measure on textiles, leather products, foot-
wear, sheet copper and many other industrial products, and because the 
TPP is a comprehensive FTA, there is ample danger of difficult times be-
setting a broad range of other fields, such as finance, medical care, labor 
mobility, and many more. The following question then arises. Given these 
hazards, why did the Kan cabinet bring up the issue of TPP participation? 
As Makoto Taniguchi (2011) has pointed out, the reasons involve the re-
cent destabilization of relations among East Asian powers (specifically the 
friction with China over the Senkaku Islands, the North Korean problem, 
and the dispute with Russia over the northern territories). One might con-
clude that Japan is beginning to distance itself from other Asian countries 
and strengthening ties with the U.S. once more in the interests of security. 
In fact, the new National Defense Program Guidelines (adopted by cabinet 
resolution on December 17, 2010), which set forth the principles for de-
fense capabilities for the decade from 2011 to 2020, corroborate this con-
clusion in a rather straightforward manner.
The new National Defense Program Guidelines differ from the previ-
ous guidelines in the following ways. First, they represent a fundamental 
rethinking of the concept of “basic defense” (exclusively defensive “static 
defense”), which has been at the foundations of the defense forces since 
the National Defense Program Guidelines were first established in 1976, 
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in that they introduce the concept of “dynamic defense”. The guidelines 
stress that:
…Japan’s future defense forces need to acquire dynamism to effective-
ly deter and respond to various contingencies, and to proactively en-
gage in activities to further stabilize the security environment in the 
Asia-Pacific and to improve the global security environment. Japan 
should no longer base its defense on the traditional defense concept, 
“Basic Defense Force Concept,” which places priority on ensuring de-
terrence through the existence of defense forces per se.
The second point concerns the Japan-U.S. alliance. The guidelines go on to 
state:
In light of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Alliance as de-
scribed above, Japan will further deepen and develop the Alliance to 
adapt to the evolving security environment. In doing so, Japan will 
continue to engage in strategic dialogue and specific policy coordina-
tion with the United States, including bilateral assessment of the se-
curity environment and bilateral consultations on common strategic 
objectives, and roles, missions and capabilities.
They even go so far as to declare, “…Japan will strengthen its cooperation 
with the Republic of Korea and Australia, which are allies of the United 
States […], through bilateral initiatives and multilateral cooperation in-
volving the United States.” The third and last point concerns relations 
with China. In response to the rise in Chinese military might, the guide-
lines set forth principles for strengthening the defense of the Nansei Is-
lands in which the Self Defense Forces are not currently stationed. This 
marks a shift in the focus of defense force deployment from the north (de-
fense against attacks from the USSR/Russia) to the southwest (defense 
against attacks from China).
The major change in course that joining the TPP would necessitate, 
namely a change taking Japan away from its commitments to regional co-
operation in East Asia, where ever closer economic ties are being built with 
China and other countries in the region (leading to the creation of an East 
Asian community), and instead in a direction driven by Japan’s military al-
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liance with the United States (the creation of an APEC community), would 
amount to “abandoning Asia to take sides with America”, so to speak, as 
well as going against the wishes of the majority of the people of Japan. 
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